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Quantum secure direct communication with pure entangled states
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Changsha, 410073, China
We present a quantum secure direct communication protocol where the channels are not maximally
entangled states. The communication parties utilize decoy photons to check eavesdropping. After
ensuring the security of the quantum channel, the sender encodes the secret message and transmits it
to the receiver by using Controlled-NOT operation and von Neumann measurement. The protocol
is simple and realizable with present technology. We also show the protocol is secure for noisy
quantum channel.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.65.Ud, 42.79.Sz
In recent years, a novel concept, quantum secure di-
rect communication (QSDC) has been proposed [1]. Dif-
ferent from quantum key distribution whose object is
to establish a common key between the communication
parties, QSDC’s object is to transmit the secret mes-
sage directly without first establishing a key to encrypt
it. QSDC can be used in some special environments,
which has been shown in Ref. [2, 3]. The works on
QSDC attracted a great deal of attention. We can
divide these works into two kinds, one utilizes single
photon [4, 5, 6], the other is based on entangled state
[2, 3, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15]. Deng et al. [4] pro-
posed a QSDC protocol by using batches of single pho-
tons which serves as quantum one-time pad cryptosys-
tem. Cai et al. [5] presented a deterministic secure direct
communication protocol using single qubit in a mixed
state. We proposed a QSDC protocol based on the order
rearrangement of single photons [6]. The QSDC proto-
col using entanglement state is certainly the mainstream.
Bostro¨m and Felbinger [2] proposed a Ping-Pong proto-
col which is quasi-secure for secure direct communication
if perfect quantum channel is used. Cai et al. [16, 17]
pointed out that the Ping-Pong protocol is vulnerable to
denial of service attack or joint horse attack with invis-
ible photon. They also presented an improved protocol
which doubled the capacity of the Ping-Pong protocol [7].
Zhang et al. [18] indicated that the ping-pong protocol
can be eavesdropped even in an ideal quantum channel.
Deng et al. [3] put forward a two-step QSDC proto-
col using Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) pairs. We pre-
sented a multiparty controlled QSDC protocol by using
Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) state and a QSDC
protocol without using perfect quantum channel [8, 9].
Wang et al. [10, 11] proposed a QSDC protocol with
quantum superdense coding and a multi-step QSDC pro-
tocol with a sequence of Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger
states. Yan and Zhang [12] presented a QSDC proto-
col using EPR pairs and teleportation. Man et al. [13]
proposed a QSDC protocol by using swapping quantum
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entanglement and local unitary operations. Gao et al.
[14, 15] presented a QSDC protocol by using GHZ states
and entanglement swapping and a controlled QSDC pro-
tocol using teleportation.
Many QSDC protocols require maximally entangled
states. However, we do not have maximally entangled
states because of decoherence and noise. Moreover, it
can only obtain almost maximally entangled states from
partially entangled states by using quantum distillation.
In this paper, we present a QSDC protocol using pure en-
tangled states. In the protocol, the communication par-
ties utilize decoy photons to ensure the security of the
quantum channel, which is similar to the method used in
Ref. [19]. If there is no eavesdropping in the transmission
line, the sender encodes the secret message and transmits
it to the receiver by using Controlled-NOT (CNOT) op-
eration and von Neumann measurement. According to
the sender’s measurement result, the receiver can obtain
the secret message. In the protocol, the transmitting
photon sequence does not carry the secret message. We
also show the present protocol is secure even with a noisy
channel.
Suppose the sender, Alice, wants to transmit her secret
message to the receiver, Bob directly. The details of our
QSDC protocol is as follows:
(S1) Alice prepares an ordered N two-photon states,
each of which is in the state
|φ〉
AB
= a|00〉
AB
+ b|11〉
AB
, (1)
where |a|2 + |b|2 = 1. We denotes the ordered
N states with {[P1(A),P1(B)], [P2(A),P2(B)], · · · ,
[PN(A),PN (B)]}, where the subscript indicates the pair
order in the sequence, and A and B represent the two
photons of each state. Alice takes one photon from each
state to form an ordered partner photon sequence [P1(A),
P2(A),· · · , PN (A)], called A sequence. The remaining
partner photons compose B sequence, [P1(B), P2(B),· · · ,
PN(B)].
(S2) Alice prepares some decoy photons for eavesdrop-
ping check. Each of the decoy photons is randomly
in one of the four states {|0〉, |1〉, |+〉= 1√
2
(|0〉 + |1〉),
|−〉= 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉)}. Alice inserts the prepared decoy
2photons in B sequence randomly and sends the new B
sequence to Bob.
(S3) After confirming that Bob has received B se-
quence, Alice publishes the position and basis of the de-
coy photons in B sequence. Bob performs von Neumann
measurement on the decoy photons according the cor-
responding measuring basis and announces publicly his
measurement result. According to Bob’s result, Alice can
then analyze the error rate during the transmission of B
sequence. If the error rate is below the threshold they
preset, Alice can conclude that there is no eavesdropper
in the line. Alice and Bob continue to the next step.
Otherwise, they abort the communication.
(S4) Alice prepares a photon a according to the bit
value of her secret message. If Alice’s secret message
bit is “0”(“1”), she prepares a photon a in the state |0〉
(|1〉). Thus Alice prepares N photons for the ordered
N states, which we call a sequence, [P1(a), P2(a),· · · ,
PN(a)]. If the state of photon Pi(a) (i = 1, 2, · · · , N) is
|0〉, then the state of the system composed by photons
Pi(a), Pi(A) and Pi(B) is
|Φ0〉aAB = |0〉a ⊗ (a|00〉+ b|11〉)AB, (2)
where the subscript a denotes Pi(a). If the state of Pi(a)
is |1〉, then the state of [Pi(a), Pi(A), Pi(B)] is
|Φ1〉aAB = |1〉a ⊗ (a|00〉+ b|11〉)AB. (3)
(S5) Alice sends photons Pi(A) and Pi(a) (i =
1, 2, · · · , N) through a CNOT gate (photon Pi(A) is the
controller and photon Pi(a) is the target). Thus |Φ0〉aAB
is changed to
|Φ′
0
〉
aAB
= (a|000〉+ b|111〉)aAB (4)
and |Φ1〉aAB becomes
|Φ′
1
〉
aAB
= (a|100〉+ b|011〉)aAB. (5)
(S6) After having done CNOT operation, Alice and
Bob measures photon Pi(a) and Pi(B) in Z-basis,
{|0〉, |1〉}, respectively. According to equations (4) and
(5), although Bob obtains his measurement result, he
cannot recover the secret message without Alice’s result.
(S7) Alice publishes her measurement results of the
photons in a sequence. Referring to Alice’s result, Bob
can recover Alice’s secret message, as illustrated in Table
1. For example, when Bob’s result is |0〉, he can conclude
TABLE I: The recovery of Alice’s secret message
Alice’s result Bob’s result secret message
|0〉 |0〉 0
|0〉 |1〉 1
|1〉 |0〉 1
|1〉 |1〉 0
that the Alice’s secret message is “0” (“1”), if Alice’s
result is |0〉 (|1〉).
So far we have proposed the QSDC protocol with pure
entangled states. Now, let us discuss the security for the
present protocol. The crucial point is that the inserted
decoy photons does not allow an eavesdropper, Eve, to
have a successful attack and Eve’s attack will be detected
by the communication parties during the eavesdropping
check. Because each of the decoy photons is randomly in
one of the four states {|0〉,|1〉,|+〉,|−〉}, the security for
the protocol is the same as that for BB84 protocol [20].
If the security of the quantum channel is ensured, the
protocol is completely secure.
According to Stinespring dilation theorem [2], Eve’s
attack can be realized by a unitary operation Eˆ on a large
Hilbert space, HAB⊗HE. The state of decoy photon and
Eve’s probe state is
Eˆ|0, ε〉 = α|0, ε00〉+ β|1, ε01〉, (6)
Eˆ|1, ε〉 = β′|0, ε10〉+ α′|1, ε11〉, (7)
Eˆ|+, ε〉 = 1√
2
[α|0, ε00〉+ β|1, ε01〉
+ β′|0, ε10〉+ α′|1, ε11〉],
=
1
2
[|+〉(α|ε00〉+ β|ε01〉+ β′|ε10〉+ α′|ε11〉)
+ |−〉(α|ε00〉 − β|ε01〉+ β′|ε10〉 − α′|ε11〉)],(8)
Eˆ|−, ε〉 = 1√
2
[α|0, ε00〉+ β|1, ε01〉
− β′|0, ε10〉 − α′|1, ε11〉],
=
1
2
[|+〉(α|ε00〉+ β|ε01〉 − β′|ε10〉 − α′|ε11〉)
+ |−〉(α|ε00〉 − β|ε01〉 − β′|ε10〉+ α′|ε11〉)],(9)
where |ε〉 denotes Eve’s probe state. The probe operator
can be written as
Eˆ =
(
α β′
β α′
)
. (10)
As Eˆ is an unitary operation, the complex numbers α, β,
α′ and β′ must satisfy EˆEˆ† = I and we can obtain the
relations
|α′|2 = |α|2, |β′|2 = |β|2. (11)
The error rate introduced by Eve is e = |β|2 = 1− |α|2.
The above analysis is based on ideal circumstances and
does not take into account noise in the transmission line.
In noisy quantum channel, Eve intercepts some transmit-
ting photons in B sequence at step (S2) and sends the
others to the receiver using a better quantum channel
in which the photon loss will not increase. During the
eavesdropping check, Eve’s attack will not be detected in
this situation. However, according to our protocol, Eve
cannot obtain Alice’s secret message without Alice’s mea-
surement result even if she captures some photons in B
sequence. If the eavesdropping check is passed, Bob tells
3Alice which photon he has received and which photon is
lost in the transmitting line at step (S6) of the protocol.
Alice then only publishes her measurement results of the
corresponding photons which Bob has received. For ex-
ample, if Bob has received photons P3(B), P6(B), · · ·
in B sequence, then Alice publishes her measurement re-
sults of photons P3(a), P6(a), · · · . As described above,
our protocol is also secure for noisy quantum channel.
So far we have proposed a QSDC protocol with pure
entangled states and analyzed the security for the present
protocol. To check eavesdropping in the transmission
line, Alice inserts some decoy photons in the transmit-
ting photon sequence. After ensuring the security of the
quantum channel, Alice encodes her secret message on
the pure entangled states by using CNOT operation. The
communication parties measures each of their photons in
Z-basis. Alice publishes her measurement result and Bob
can then recover Alice’s secret message. The present pro-
tocol is efficient in that all pure entangled states are used
to transmit the secret message. We also point out that
our protocol is secure with noisy quantum channel. As
for the experimental feasibility, our protocol can be real-
ized with today’s technologies.
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